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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between shareholdings of various investor 
groups and stock liquidity for Malaysian public listed firms over the 2002-2009 
sample period. Using the Amihud illiquidity ratio, we extend the literature by 
addressing the issues of investor heterogeneity, trading account types and the 
interactions of competing liquidity channels. The analysis reveals that only 
local institutions and local individual investors who trade through the direct 
accounts are significantly associated with the liquidity of domestic firms. In 
contrast, the significant liquidity effect for foreign investors operates through 
the nominee accounts. While institutional ownership exhibits a linear negative 
relationship, our findings on local individuals and foreign nominees differ 
greatly from previous studies in that their relationship with stock liquidity is 
non-monotonic. Apart from the widely researched information asymmetry and 
trading effects, we find that liquidity is also driven by the largely ignored 
information competition channel. An important insight from our findings is 
that the large shareholdings by any particular investor group is detrimental to 
stock liquidity as they exacerbate information asymmetry, reduce the degree of 
competition and lower the level of trading activity.  
 
JEL Classifications: G12; G32 
 
Keywords: Investor groups; Stock liquidity; Information asymmetry; Information 
competition; Trading; Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Version: 25 July 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Corresponding author. Kian-Ping Lim, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics & Administration, University 
of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Tel: +603-79673666; Fax: +603-79567252; Email: 
kianpinglim@um.edu.my.  
	  	   2 
1. Introduction 
The liquidity in interbank markets, balance sheet assets and financial markets have received 
extensive media coverage during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The crisis suggests that the 
three markets are interconnected, further reaffirmed by recent empirical evidence that stock 
liquidity is affected by a firm’s own liquid assets and liquidity in the interbank markets (see 
Gopalan et al., 2012; Nyborg and Östberg, 2014). However, the focus of this study is not on their 
interactions, but rather on the liquidity of public listed stocks so as to identify the internal driving 
forces from the equity market itself. The extensive surveys conducted by Amihud et al. (2006) and 
Holden et al. (2014) clearly demonstrate the breadth and depth of the stock liquidity literature. On 
the theoretical front, many models have been developed to explore the different dimensions of 
liquidity. Earlier framework generally addresses the effects of informed trading on liquidity (see 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). However, in recent years, greater emphasis 
has been given to the modelling of financial constraints and liquidity dry-ups (see Gârleanu and 
Pedersen, 2007; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). The empirical literature, on the other hand, 
explores the determinants and effects of stock liquidity.1, 2 
 
It is worth highlighting that empirical liquidity studies focus mainly on developed stock markets, 
in particularly the United States. One of the main reasons is the lack of liquidity measures for firms 
traded in emerging stock markets, since the commercially accessible trading volume does not 
measure trading costs or the price impact of transactions. Bid-ask spread, widely used as a liquidity 
benchmark, is unfortunately difficult to collect for emerging market firms over extended time 
periods. Given this limitation, several studies propose new liquidity proxies that can be constructed 
using data available at the daily frequency such as closing prices, trading volume, low and high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As an independent variable, academic studies find that liquidity is a priced risk factor of stock returns (see the survey 
paper by Amihud et al., 2006). Liquidity also influences the decision of capital structure (Lipson and Mortal, 2009), 
enhances market efficiency (Chordia et al., 2008), increases firm performance (Fang et al., 2009) and improves 
corporate governance (Edmans et al., 2013).  
2 As a dependent variable, the literature explores the contributing factors of stock liquidity, which include corporate 
governance (Chung et al., 2010), financial transparency (Heflin et al., 2005), financial liberalization (Vagias and van 
Dijk, 2012), security analysts (Roulstone, 2003), local institutions (Agarwal, 2007), local blockholders (Brockman et 
al., 2009), local individual investors (Amihud et al., 1999) and foreign institutions (Rhee and Wang, 2009). 
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prices (for the liquidity menu, see Goyenko et al., 2009; Fong et al., 2014b). This positive 
development has contributed to a gradual increase in the understudied emerging markets in recent 
decade. Among others, Lesmond (2005) and Griffin et al. (2010) find that the liquidity of emerging 
market firms is still at a lower level relative to those in more developed economies. Given the 
profound effects of liquidity on many aspects of corporate finance, it warrants more research to 
uncover the list of factors underlie the poor liquidity in emerging market firms. 
 
This paper focuses exclusively on the stock market of a developing economy– Malaysia, since 
there is no one-size-fits-all policy that can be derived from broad cross-country results. Though the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was incorporated in 1976 (renamed as Bursa Malaysia in 
2004), there has been very few published studies on the liquidity of Malaysian stocks over nearly 
four decades. Our literature search only finds Foo and Mat Zain (2010), Ramlee and Ali (2012) and 
Azevedo et al. (2014) the few Malaysian liquidity papers. From a policy perspective, improving the 
liquidity of Bursa Malaysia has always been a key objective for the stock exchange regulators. 
Numerous initiatives have been undertaken by the Malaysian authorities over the years to improve 
liquidity such as demutualization, the launching of Capital Market Masterplan, reducing lot size 
from 1000 to 100, promoting investor relations, introducing Capital Market Development Fund-
Bursa Research Scheme, boosting retail participation and introducing proprietary day traders. In his 
keynote address at Invest Malaysia on 30 June 2009, the Prime Minister of Malaysia announced a 
series of bold liberalization measures to boost foreign portfolio investments and put Bursa Malaysia 
on the radar screen of international fund managers. Reading through the objectives of these 
initiatives, we find that the Malaysian policymakers generally define liquidity in terms of trading 
activity such as share volume or turnover. This is understandable because the demutualized Bursa 
Malaysia needs to attract huge trading volume to remain profitable. Despite counterintuitive, the 
empirical results in Lesmond (2005) and Barinov (2014) show that more frequently traded stocks do 
not necessarily correspond with higher liquidity. The “Flash Crash” in the U.S. stock markets that 
took place on May 6, 2010 is a good example of liquidity drying up amid very high trading volume. 
	  	   4 
Thus, the lack of Malaysian liquidity studies and the narrow interpretation of liquidity by the local 
authorities motivate our empirical investigation.  
 
A pertinent issue to Malaysian policymakers, which we take up here, is to distinguish the types 
of investor which improve liquidity from those that reduce the liquidity of local public listed stocks. 
There is no prior research on the liquidity roles of various investor groups mainly because 
Malaysian ownership data are not reported in public listed companies’ annual reports and 
commercial databases (such as Standard & Poor’s Emerging Markets Database or Thomson 
Datastream). Only in recent years that Bursa Malaysia is engaged in the business of providing 
information products and services for its equities and derivatives markets. We are able to obtain the 
commercial corporate ownership dataset from the local bourse for all public listed firms over the 
sample period 2002-2009. Table 1 provides the shareholdings by investor types at the end of each 
calendar year. In terms of nationality, it is obvious that Malaysian investors dominate the local 
stock market, holding more than 80% of the total outstanding shares for all sampled years. Among 
the domestic investors, institutions and nominees are the major holders with each of them having 
around 25% shareholdings. Unlike the distribution of Malaysian investors, about two-thirds of the 
foreign shareholdings are held through the nominee accounts. Another observation is the negligible 
shareholdings by foreign government agencies throughout the sample period, and hence they will 
not be included in our empirical analysis on investor heterogeneity. This leaves us with five 
mutually exclusive investor types– local individual investors, local institutional investors, local 
government agencies, foreign individuals and foreign institutions.3 The extant literature generally 
focuses on one specific investor type in each study, covering local individual investors (Amihud et 
al., 1999; Ahn et al., 2014; Wang and Zhang, 2015), local institutions (Agarwal, 2007; Rubin, 
2007; Jiang et al., 2011), local government (Choi et al., 2010; Borisova and Yadav, 2012; Ding, 
2014) and foreign institutions (Rhee and Wang, 2009; Agudelo, 2010; Ng et al., 2015). We thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In many existing studies, the relationship between ownership structure and liquidity is examined from the sole 
perspective of information asymmetry, and thus the investor groups examined are potential informed traders– corporate 
insiders, blockholders and local institutions, in which their shareholdings are overlapped. Without partitioning, one 
cannot confidently pinpoint the specific investor group that drives liquidity (for details, see Rubin, 2007). 
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extend the literature by exploring the competing roles of five different investor groups in the 
Malaysian stock market.  
 
Table 1 
End of Year Shareholdings for All Public Listed Companies on Bursa Malaysia (in %) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of 
Listed Firms 849 865 890 918 1016 991 981 968 
         
Panel A: Malaysian 
Individuals 18.81 18.71 19.49 19.63 21.93 21.56 21.89 21.69 
Institutions 23.80 26.38 26.48 26.32 25.35 25.13 25.46 27.04 
Government 10.38 9.58 9.48 9.14 8.69 7.73 9.18 9.04 
Nominees 30.12 28.39 27.5 27.86 26.53 25.27 26.61 26.07 
Others 0.25 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.03 
         
Panel B: Foreign 
Individuals 1.18 1.26 1.20 1.33 1.51 1.43 1.39 1.29 
Institutions 3.22 3.12 3.51 3.29 3.15 3.14 3.06 3.30 
Government 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Nominees 11.57 11.76 11.57 11.63 12.19 15.24 12.20 11.42 
Others 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.53 0.38 0.11 0.12 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on the firm-level shareholdings data provided by Bursa Malaysia. 
Note:  Institutional shareholdings are the sum of shareholdings by banks, investment trusts and other 
corporations. 
 
 
The uniqueness of this dataset allows us to compare the liquidity roles of investors that trade 
through direct versus nominee accounts, a novel contribution to the extant literature since the stock 
market effects of nominee trading have not hitherto been addressed.4 During the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, foreign nominees received wide negative coverage in the Malaysian press. The 
government constantly blamed foreign investors registered under the name of nominee companies 
for the downfall of Kuala Lumpur Composite Index, arguing that they lent shares to speculators 
who short sell and cause stock prices to plunge. To prevent speculation, the overseas trading of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The closest that we find is the classification of individual investors based on the types of retail brokers they use– 
discount versus full-service retail brokers (Fong et al., 2014a; Tian et al., 2015).  
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Malaysian listed securities, in particular those on Singapore’s Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) 
International over-the-counter market, was prohibited on 1 September 1998. Stockbroking 
companies were also required to take all reasonable steps to obtain essential particulars and 
information of their clients. Under this ‘know your client” rule, all nominee accounts must state the 
full name and other particulars of the beneficiary. This ruling does not deter domestic and foreign 
investors from trading through the nominee accounts as they constitute about one-thirds of the total 
shareholdings in Bursa Malaysia. Their substantial stakes, however, do not generate any interest 
from researchers until recently when Lim et al. (2013) conduct a pioneering work on the 
relationship between foreign investors and price efficiency of Malaysian stocks. Using the same 
ownership dataset provided by Bursa Malaysia, these authors find that foreign investors who trade 
through the nominee accounts are responsible for the swift incorporation of public information into 
stock prices. However, such price discovery does not occur when foreign investors trade through 
the direct accounts. We thus complement Lim et al. (2013) on the analysis of nominee accounts, but 
expanding the scope to stock liquidity. 
 
In the literature, existing theoretical models offer rich insights on the underlying channels 
through which investors affect stock liquidity. The proposed mechanisms include information 
asymmetry, competition among informed traders and the level of trading activity. While previous 
studies develop their hypotheses and rationalize their empirical findings based on these theories, 
most of them do not formally explore the underlying liquidity channels, with Agarwal (2007), 
Rubin (2007), Brockman et al. (2009), Ding (2014) and Ng et al. (2015) the notable exceptions. 
Agarwal (2007) explores the trade-off between information asymmetry and competition, whereas 
the remaining four studies consider separately the channels of information asymmetry and trading 
activity. This study adds to the literature by examining all three possible mechanisms, which serves 
to uncover the forces that drive the relationship between each investor group and stock liquidity. 
Since these channels are theoretically grounded, the analysis partially alleviates the concern of 
reverse causality from liquidity to corporate shareholdings. In the context of Malaysia, some of the 
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policies formulated are directed towards attracting the participation of specific investor groups, such 
as boosting retail participation, stock market liberalization measures and the divestment of 
government shareholdings in public listed companies. However, these initiatives might not yield the 
intended liquidity benefit if the investor type-liquidity relationship is non-monotonic, implying the 
interplay of different driving forces at varying levels of shareholdings. Hence, further analysis of 
the underlying mechanisms is pertinent so that effective policies can be prescribed.  
 
Given our access to the corporate ownership data assembled by Bursa Malaysia for the sample 
period 2002-2009, we explore the liquidity roles of various investor groups in the local bourse. We 
use the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio as our dependent variable because of its theoretical appeal 
and empirical reliability as verified in a series of liquidity horseraces. Our aggregate to disaggregate 
analysis demonstrates the differing liquidity effects of those investor groups under study. First, even 
though the aggregate analysis using total local ownership or total foreign ownership shows strong 
liquidity effect, the disaggregate shareholdings reveal that the significant results are driven by 
certain investor groups. This highlights the shortcomings of empirical liquidity studies using macro-
level portfolio equity flows (see Tesar and Werner, 1995; Vagias and van Dijk, 2012) as they ignore 
within-country investor heterogeneity. Second, we find that only local institutions and local 
individual investors who trade through the direct accounts are significantly associated with the 
liquidity of domestic firms. In contrast, the significant liquidity effect for foreign investors operates 
through the nominee accounts. This significant result for nominee accounts is a new addition to the 
literature, after recent studies uncover informed trading through the accounts of children by their 
guardians (Berkman et al., 2013) and the accounts with full-service retail brokers by individual 
investors (Fong et al., 2014a).  
 
Existing liquidity studies mostly specify their model in the linear form, mainly because of their 
sole focus on asymmetric information effect. Our empirical results underscore the importance of 
functional form and the possibility of drawing incorrect inferences when linearity in assumed. 
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Given the opposing effects predicted by existing liquidity channels, the possibility of a non-
monotonic relationship cannot be ruled out. Indeed, while institutional ownership exhibits a linear 
negative relationship, our findings on local individuals and foreign nominees differ greatly from 
previous studies in that their association with stock liquidity is non-monotonic. Further analysis 
indicates that the dominance of government-owned public institutions might account for the 
negative liquidity effect, as their large shareholdings exacerbate information asymmetry, reduce the 
degree of competition and lower the level of trading activity. For individual investors, we observe 
the interactions of two opposing effects which might give rise to the non-monotonic relationship. 
On one hand, individual investors increase the level of information asymmetry and lower the degree 
of competition, possibly due to the concentration of ownership in the hands of family (see Carney 
and Child, 2013). On the contrasting end, the active trading activity of individual investors 
improves the liquidity of Malaysian stocks. Finally, we find that higher foreign shareholdings are 
associated with lower level of information asymmetry, higher degree of competition and more 
trading activity. All three channels imply a monotonic positive relationship in which higher 
shareholdings by foreign nominees increase the level of stock liquidity. We conjecture that the 
reported reduction in liquidity after foreign shareholdings exceed the threshold point is due to the 
dominance of a strong negative effect, which is not captured by the three theoretically grounded 
liquidity channels. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theories, variables 
and model specification. Section 3 describes the sample selection process and provides descriptive 
statistics for the sample data. Section 4 presents the empirical results using aggregate and 
disaggregate shareholdings. The underlying liquidity channels are further explored in Section 5. The 
final section contains the conclusion. 
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2. Theories, Measurement of Variables and Model Specification 
 
This section provides a brief discussion on the existing theoretical models that predict the 
relationship between investor types and stock liquidity. The subsections also discuss the 
measurement of all variables and their respective data sources. Finally, we outline our baseline 
regression models and the estimation method. 
 
2.1 Existing theories on investor type-stock liquidity relation 
When exploring the investor type-liquidity relation, the information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed traders stands out as the popular explanation. Under this hypothesis, a key 
determinant of liquidity is the extent to which the amount of information varies from one investor 
group to another. More specifically, this strand of models predicts that when privately informed 
traders possess superior information relative to other market participants, such information 
asymmetry reduces stock liquidity due to the adverse selection costs of trading (see Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). The theoretical prediction that liquidity 
decreases with the level of information asymmetry has been widely used to infer which investor 
group is better informed. For instance, based on the negative relationship between local 
blockholdings and liquidity, the empirical studies by Heflin and Shaw (2000) and Rubin (2007) 
identify blockholders as having privileged access to private information who exacerbate 
information asymmetry. Ng et al. (2015) find that controlling foreign direct investors impair stock 
liquidity because their information advantage increases the level of information asymmetry. Chung 
et al. (1995) and Jiang et al. (2011) report a negative relationship between analyst coverage and 
stock liquidity, arguing that extensive analyst coverage is perceived as a signal of higher 
information asymmetry. 
 
The liquidity dampening effect of informed trading has become the focal point that its positive 
influence is largely neglected by existing empirical studies. One central prediction of strategic 
trader models (Subrahmanyam, 1991; Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, 1992) is that liquidity improves 
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when the number of informed investors increases. In these models, the increasing competition 
among informed traders who act strategically accelerates the rate at which information is 
incorporated into stock prices. With the information efficiency of stock prices increases, traders are 
more willing to accommodate supply shocks, resulting in improved liquidity. Empirically, only 
Agarwal (2007) explores this information competition channel. The author criticizes previous 
liquidity studies for their sole focus on adverse selection costs imposed by informed institutions. 
Instead, he predicts a non-monotonic relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity due 
to the trade-off between the two competing effects of information asymmetry and competition. His 
analysis using U.S. firm-level data confirms the existence of a threshold level, with the positive 
effect of liquidity reverses after institutional ownership reaches 35%–40%.  
 
Another possible channel that investors might affect liquidity is through the level of their trading 
activity. Some theoretical models predict an inverse relation between blockholdings and liquidity 
because a large block reduces free float, causing fewer trades and a fall in liquidity (see Holmström 
and Tirole, 1993; Bolton and von Thadden, 1998). Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show theoretically 
that liquidity is an increasing function of noise trading. Rubin (2007) contends that institutions tend 
to turn over their portfolio more often than other investors, driven by their investment policies, 
agency problems or investment objectives. Such frequent trading reduces the average transaction 
cost and leads to an increase in stock liquidity. His subsequent empirical analysis finds a positive 
association between institutional ownership and liquidity which is primarily driven by higher 
trading activity. The empirical work of Brockman et al. (2009) reveals that liquidity decreases with 
institutional blockholdings, and this occurs mainly through reduced trading activity and not due to 
greater adverse selection costs. Apart from information asymmetry, Ng et al. (2015) find that the 
liquidity effect of foreign investors depends on the level of their trading intensity. Foreign portfolio 
investors, who gain ownership without the control of local firms, improve the liquidity of local 
stocks through their active trading activity. Foreign direct investors, who hold at least 5% of a 
firm’s outstanding shares, have a detrimental effect on stock liquidity because of the inactive 
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trading of their large block of shares.  
 
2.2 Measuring stock liquidity 
Liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept that cannot be directly observed. Even at present, there 
is still no consensus in the academic literature on its definition and measurement. From the 
perspective of investors, liquidity simply refers to the ease of trading large quantities of stocks 
quickly without a major price concession. We thus define liquidity from the aspect of market depth, 
using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio to measure the price change per unit of volume. This low-
frequency measure is consistent with the notion of illiquidity espoused in the theoretical model of 
Kyle (1985), the lambda parameter which captures the impact of order flow on stock price. 
Empirically, the reliability of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio has been verified in a series of 
horseraces using data from the U.S. (Goyenko et al., 2009), emerging markets (Lesmond, 2005), 
frontier markets (Marshall et al., 2013) and global stock exchanges (Fong et al., 2014b). In these 
four studies, the Amihud ratio is found to exhibit one of the highest correlations among cost-per-
volume proxies with intraday benchmarks. Hence, the theoretical appeal and empirical performance 
has made Amihud price impact the most popular liquidity measure in finance research.5  
 
The Amihud illiquidity ratio is computed as the daily ratio of the absolute stock returns to the 
local currency trading volume. The illiquidity ratio for stock  on trading day  can be written as: 
 
 
 
where  is the daily stock returns,  is the daily closing stock prices and  is the number 
of shares traded on day  To obtain the annual Amihud illiquidity measure for stock  we average 
the computed daily ratios across all trading days for each calendar year. Higher values of  
indicate greater illiquidity, which occur when the prices move a lot but the volumes traded are low. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For instance, Lou and Shu (2014) report that over one hundred papers using the Amihud illiquidity ratio in their 
empirical analysis have been published in the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics and Review of 
Financial Studies during 2009-2013.  
i  d
 
ILLIQi,d =
Ri,d
Pi,d ⋅  VOi,d
 
Ri,d  
Pi,d  
VOi,d
d.  i,
 ILLIQ
(1) 
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On the other hand, when stocks are traded in large trading volume but with small price change, the 
resulting  will have smaller values and thus considered as highly liquid. Thomson 
Datastream provides the daily data on stock prices and number of shares traded for computing the 
Amihud illiquidity ratio. 
 
2.3 Independent variables for investor groups 
Our annual ownership dataset “End of Year Shareholdings by Type of Investor” for the sample 
period 2002-2009 is provided by Bursa Malaysia, which includes all publicly listed firms on the 
local stock exchange. The ownership dataset first divides investors along nationality of Malaysian 
and foreign, and then classifies them into seven types: (1) individuals; (2) banks; (3) investment 
trusts; (4) other corporations; (5) government agencies; (6) nominees; (7) others. For each investor 
type, the stock exchange provides the total number of shareholders and the total number of shares. 
Following the convention in the literature, we put banks, investment trusts and other corporations 
under the category of institutions. Shareholding is computed as the total shares held by each 
investor group divided by the total shares outstanding in each firm at the end of every calendar year. 
Due to the nature of the data, we explore the relationship between investor types and stock liquidity 
in three stages. First, investor heterogeneity is examined along nationality, aggregating the 
shareholdings for all seven investor types to compute total local ownership and total foreign 
ownership for each firm in each year. Second, we determine whether trading account types affect 
the investor type-liquidity relationship by computing shareholdings for direct and nominee 
accounts. Finally, the direct accounts are disaggregated into local institutions, local individuals, 
local government agencies, foreign institutions and foreign individuals. Bursa Malaysia does not 
provide such breakdown for the nominee accounts. 
 
2.4 Control variables 
We control for a set of standard liquidity determinants– analyst coverage, firm size, stock 
returns, turnover, and return volatility. Roulstone (2003) documents a positive relationship between 
 ILLIQ
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analyst coverage and stock liquidity because the former increases public information. However, 
Chung et al. (1995) and Jiang et al. (2011) report contradictory negative relationship, arguing that 
extensive analyst coverage is perceived as a signal of higher information asymmetry. Unlike analyst 
coverage, there is a consensus on the relationship between liquidity and the four firm 
characteristics. Firms with larger size, better return performance and higher turnover are expected to 
be more liquid. Return volatility, on the other hand, is negatively associated with liquidity because 
volatile stocks reflect greater uncertainty and higher inventory costs.  
 
We collect from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) the number of unique 
analysts issuing earnings forecasts for a particular stock in each year. Following the common 
practice, analyst coverage is set equal to zero for a firm-year observation if a firm is not listed on 
the I/B/E/S database or does not have earnings forecasts for any given year. One limitation of 
I/B/E/S is that its coverage is bias towards larger firms, which is supported by the strong positive 
correlation between analyst coverage and firm size. To address this problem, we thus follow the 
literature to regress the natural logarithm of one plus the analyst coverage on natural logarithm of 
firm size. The residual from this regression, known as residual analyst coverage, is used as our 
proxy for analyst following. The data for the remaining four control variables are collected from 
Thomson Datastream. First, firm size is measured by market capitalization at the end of each 
trading day and averaged over the calendar year. Second, we compute annual stock returns by 
taking the time series average of daily returns. Third, stock turnover is defined as the number of 
shares traded scaled by the number of shares outstanding. We average the daily turnover ratios 
across the year as our annual measure for each firm. The last variable is stock return volatility, 
computed as the standard deviation of daily returns over the year. 
 
2.5 Model specification 
In the literature on investor type-liquidity relation, most empirical studies focus solely on the 
theoretical prediction of asymmetric information models, and thus their regression is specified in 
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the linear form. However, Agarwal (2007) highlights the neglected information competition 
channel, in which liquidity improves as a result of growing competition among informed traders. 
Another channel that investors might affect liquidity is through the level of their trading activity. 
The interplay among the three effects of information asymmetry, competition and trading intensity 
might give rise to a non-monotonic relationship. Nevertheless, the absence of mandatory 
requirements for corporate disclosure by Bursa Malaysia during our sample period suggests certain 
investor groups might have privileged access to private information, and hence the dominance of 
the information asymmetry effect. To accommodate these possibilities, we specify the pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model in both linear and quadratic forms as follows: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 refers to the natural logarithm. The dependent variable  is the annual Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio, with the daily Amihud ratios averaged across all trading days for each 
calendar year. The key variable of  represents the shareholdings of investors, classified 
based on nationality, trading accounts or investor types.  denotes residual analyst 
coverage, where the residual comes from a regression of natural logarithm of one plus the analyst 
coverage on natural logarithm of firm size. The analyst coverage is the number of analysts issuing 
earnings forecasts for a firm over the year. We measure firm size  as the market 
capitalization for a firm at the end of each trading day and averaged over a year.  is the 
ln ILLIQ( )i,t =α0 + β1INVESTORi,t−1 + β2 ANALYSTSRESID( )i,t−1 +
                       β3 lnSIZEi,t−1 + β4 lnTURNOVERi,t−1 +
                       β5RETURNi,t−1 + β6VOLATILITYi,t−1 + ε i,t
ln ILLIQ( )i,t =α0 + γ 1INVESTORi,t−1 + γ 2INVESTORi,t−12 +
                      γ 3 ANALYSTSRESID( )i,t−1 +  γ 4 lnSIZEi,t−1 +
                       γ 5 lnTURNOVERi,t−1 + γ 6RETURNi,t−1 +
                       γ 7VOLATILITYi,t−1 + ε i,t
 ln( ) ILLIQ
INVESTOR
ANALYSTSRESID
SIZE( )
TURNOVER
(2) 
(3) 
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annual average of daily turnover ratios,  the time series average of daily returns for each 
year, and  the standard deviation of daily returns over the year.  
 
3.  The Sample 
We first discuss how the sample for this research is constructed using the Bursa Malaysia’s 
annual ownership dataset “End of Year Shareholdings by Type of Investor”.  
 
3.1 Sample firms 
Even though the corporate ownership dataset covers all public listed firms on Bursa Malaysia, 
not all of them are included in the final sample due to delisting, suspension and incomplete stock 
data. The first criterion in our sample construction is to ensure that those selected firms are in 
existence throughout the 8-year sample period to ensure sufficient data points, and this matching 
procedure produces 654 firms. The second step of filtering aims to ensure that data for all the 654 
firms are available in Thomson Datastream, so that our liquidity proxy can be constructed. It is 
found that some of the firms have no price data (denoted N/A) for extended time, which is 
obviously due to suspension. However, it is less clear-cut for those firms with stale closing prices 
because this situation could arise due to: (1) no price movement; (2) public holidays; (3) trading 
suspension. The first case is genuine because stocks with low liquidity and high transaction costs 
can have valid zero return even on positive volume days (see Lesmond, 2005). For public holidays 
or trading suspension, Datastream will use the closing prices of the last trading day. We manually 
delete public holidays from the Datastream dataset which affect all stocks. To determine whether 
the listed firms are suspended by the stock exchange, we cross-check with the “Company 
Announcements” from Bursa Malaysia’s website.6 From this verification process, we then exclude 
those suspended firms that have stale closing prices and zero trading volume for more than one 
calendar year. As a result of these filters and checks, the final sample comprises 600 stocks over the 
8-year period from 2002 to 2009. Table 2 provides the shareholdings by investor types for all the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/listed-companies/company-announcements/.  
RETURN
VOLATILITY
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600 sample firms. The distribution for the sample closely resembles those of the population in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 2 
End of Year Shareholdings for Public Listed Companies in the Final Sample (in %) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of 
Sample Firms 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
         
Panel A: Malaysian 
Individuals 17.93 17.83 18.69 18.72 18.56 17.59 17.87 18.31 
Institutions 24.23 25.69 25.36 25.09 23.83 24.38 24.92 26.04 
Government 12.07 10.87 10.61 10.03 10.34 9.24 10.17 9.41 
Nominees 29.16 28.53 27.74 28.87 28.64 27.17 29.51 29.11 
Others 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.02 
         
Panel B: Foreign 
Individuals 1.18 1.31 1.26 1.30 1.28 1.07 1.10 1.04 
Institutions 3.45 3.38 3.55 3.39 3.44 3.08 2.96 3.22 
Government 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Nominees 10.87 11.38 11.79 11.65 13.11 16.90 13.19 12.67 
Others 0.85 0.79 0.82 0.80 0.66 0.43 0.17 0.18 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on the firm-level shareholdings data provided by Bursa Malaysia. 
Note:  Institutional shareholdings are the sum of shareholdings by banks, investment trusts and other 
corporations. 
 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Both the Amihud illiquidity ratio and its natural logarithm are included in the table. Previous 
studies generally use log transformation because the ratio is highly skewed. We find similar 
distribution for the Amihud measure in our sample, and logging the variable is able to eliminate its 
natural skewness. The average Amihud ratio reported for Malaysian stocks in Lesmond (2005) is 
0.773 for the sample period of 1987-2000. With a mean of 1.1260, Table 3 suggests that the 
liquidity of Malaysian stocks has deteriorated in the 2000s despite numerous initiatives undertaken 
by Bursa Malaysia. Given the lack of Malaysian liquidity studies, it is timely to examine the 
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determinants of stock liquidity in the local bourse so that effective policies can be prescribed. Our 
focus is on the liquidity roles of various investor groups given that the market cannot function 
without their participation. The statistical measures for central tendency and dispersion further 
complement Table 2, providing an overall picture of the variability in the shareholdings of various 
investor groups, both at the cross-sectional and time series dimensions. Notably, local individuals, 
local institutions and local nominees are the top three investor groups in Bursa Malaysia. However, 
it remains to be determined whether their large stakes are significantly associated with the level of 
stock liquidity. 
  
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for all the variables. The correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the Amihud illiquidity ratio provides a preliminary view of their 
univariate relationship. In this univariate framework, all the control variables for firm characteristics 
have the expected relationship, consistent with previous liquidity studies. Security analysts have 
negative coefficient, indicating their participation is associated with an improvement in stock 
liquidity. Shareholdings by various investor groups have differing signs, suggesting that they play 
different liquidity roles in the Malaysian stock market. However, these univariate relationships 
might change or become insignificant when all competing variables are included in the same 
multivariate regression model. The correlation coefficients between explanatory variables are 
within plausible ranges. When the correlation between two variables is high, they will not be 
included in the same model. For instance, total local ownership LOCALALL( )  and total foreign 
ownership FOREIGNALL( )  have perfect negative correlation, and thus separate regressions are 
estimated to avoid the problem of perfect multicollinearity. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
 1.1260 0.1064 7.1736 29.1424 1217.7280 
 -2.4930 -2.2407 2.5457 -0.4064 3.2853 
 0.8602 0.9413 0.1829 -1.7914 5.4510 
 0.5989 0.6116 0.2314 -0.2682 2.0072 
 0.2613 0.2117 0.1910 0.7799 2.7703 
 0.2970 0.2572 0.2030 0.8288 3.1823 
 0.2508 0.1977 0.2121 0.7501 2.5498 
 0.0496 0.0019 0.1115 3.8594 20.2172 
 0.1398 0.0588 0.1829 1.7914 5.4510 
 0.0629 0.0091 0.1424 2.9297 10.6774 
 0.0769 0.0262 0.1151 2.6384 11.6539 
 0.0200 0.0059 0.0594 6.9705 59.2454 
 0.0358 0.0002 0.1148 3.8337 17.3476 
 0.5596 0.0000 0.9481 1.6947 4.8531 
 5.1409 4.8727 1.5702 0.8528 3.9049 
 -0.0113 0.0000 0.2027 -0.6261 9.5282 
 -7.1048 -7.1455 1.5397 0.0298 3.1969 
 3.2949 2.7146 2.3825 5.2812 74.7015 
Notes:  refers to the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, with the daily Amihud ratios averaged across all 
trading days for each calendar year. refers to the natural logarithm of Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio.
 
 and denote the proportion of shareholdings owned by Malaysian and foreign 
investors at year end, respectively; the subscripts indicate the types of investor– ALL: total shareholdings, 
DIR: direct shareholdings, NOM: nominee shareholdings, IND: individual shareholdings, INST: 
institutional shareholdings, GOV: government shareholdings.  refers to residual analyst 
coverage, where the residual comes from a regression of natural logarithm of one plus the analyst 
coverage on natural logarithm of firm size. The analyst coverage is the number of analysts issuing 
earnings forecasts for a firm over the year.  is the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the 
end of each trading day and averaged over a year. is the time series average of daily returns for 
each year.  is the time series average of daily natural logarithm of turnover ratios. 
is the standard deviation of daily returns over the year. 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix for All Variables 
 
 ln ILLIQ( )   ln SIZE( )  RETURN  ln TURNOVER( )  VOLATILITY   
ln ILLIQ( )  1.0000       
 -0.6060 1.0000      
ln SIZE( )  -0.8228 0.7112 1.0000     
 -0.1807 0.0943 0.1510 1.0000    
ln TURNOVER( )  -0.4248 0.1241 0.1011 0.2058 1.0000   
VOLATILITY  0.5227 -0.2886 -0.4765 -0.0982 -0.0447 1.0000  
LOCALALL  0.2451 -0.2285 -0.3323 -0.0721 0.0899 0.1801 1.0000 
LOCALDIR  0.2892 -0.2265 -0.3361 -0.0328 -0.0908 0.1152 0.5969 
LOCALNOM  -0.1155 0.0556 0.0888 -0.0294 0.1961 0.0330 0.2348 
LOCALIND  0.3914 -0.4053 -0.5935 -0.0953 0.0985 0.2565 0.3641 
LOCALINST  0.0502 0.0032 0.0429 0.0455 -0.1602 -0.0413 0.2922 
LOCALGOV  -0.2067 0.2598 0.2973 0.0184 -0.0568 -0.1457 0.0194 
FOREIGNALL  -0.2451 0.2285 0.3323 0.0721 -0.0899 -0.1801 -1.0000 
FOREIGNDIR  -0.0079 0.0381 0.0781 0.0232 -0.1785 -0.1059 -0.7771 
FOREIGNNOM  -0.3800 0.3160 0.4314 0.0859 0.0781 -0.1552 -0.6275 
FOREIGNIND  0.0689 -0.0777 -0.0890 -0.0071 -0.0354 -0.0138 -0.3386 
FOREIGNINST  -0.0232 0.0470 0.0960 0.0233 -0.1558 -0.0883 -0.6328 
        
 LOCALDIR  LOCALNOM
 LOCALIND  LOCALINST  LOCALGOV  FOREIGNALL  FOREIGNDIR  
LOCALDIR
 1.0000       
LOCALNOM
 -0.6398 1.0000      
LOCALIND
 0.4634 -0.2127 1.0000     
LOCALINST
 0.5824 -0.4257 -0.3058 1.0000    
LOCALGOV
 0.1272 -0.1355 -0.2695 -0.1267 1.0000   
FOREIGNALL
 -0.5969 -0.2348 -0.3641 -0.2922 -0.0194 1.0000  
FOREIGNDIR
 -0.4068 -0.2516 -0.2042 -0.2354 -0.0239 0.7771 1.0000 
FOREIGNNOM
 -0.4452 -0.0617 -0.3259 -0.1731 -0.0012 0.6275 -0.0024 
FOREIGNIND
 -0.1441 -0.1498 0.0064 -0.1274 -0.0661 0.3386 0.4580 
FOREIGNINST
 -0.3413 -0.1927 -0.1954 -0.1766 -0.0132 0.6328 0.8117 
        
 FOREIGNNOM  FOREIGNIND  FOREIGNINST      
FOREIGNNOM
 1.0000       
FOREIGNIND
 -0.0286 1.0000      
FOREIGNINST
 0.0012 0.0509 1.0000     
Notes:  The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in the notes to Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSTRESID LOCALALL
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4.  Investor Types and Stock Liquidity 
In this section, we use a top-down approach where the investor type-liquidity relationship is first 
examined at the aggregate level of total shareholdings, in view of the unabated debate on whether 
local or foreign investors are more informed (see references cited in Bae et al., 2012). Following 
that, we compare the liquidity roles of investors that trade through direct versus nominee accounts, 
providing the first evidence on the stock market effects of nominee trading. The last analysis 
addresses investor heterogeneity in which the direct accounts are disaggregated into five mutually 
exclusive investor groups– local individual investors, local institutional investors, local government 
agencies, foreign individuals and foreign institutions. 
 
4.1 Foreign versus local investors: aggregate shareholdings 
In the first stage of aggregate analysis, we estimate the linear and quadratic models using total 
foreign ownership and total local ownership as the proxies for  By construction, these 
two variables must add up to 100%, and thus including both in the same model would lead to 
perfect multicollinearity. Panel A of Table 5 presents the estimation results for equations (2) and (3) 
in the case of total foreign ownership-liquidity relation. In the linear model, the coefficient for total 
foreign ownership is insignificant, or weakly significant when year and industry dummies are added 
to account for potential year and industry fixed effects, respectively. Existing liquidity studies 
generally estimate a linear model due to their sole focus on asymmetric information effect, and in 
this case, will erroneously infer that the participation of foreign investors has no effect on the 
liquidity of Malaysian stocks. However, our results from the quadratic model confirm that a 
monotonic relationship is unrealistic given the dynamics of foreign investor heterogeneity and 
competing liquidity channels. More specifically, the coefficients for total foreign ownership, both 
the first-order variable and its squared term, are highly significant in all model specifications with 
their signs consistent with a U-shaped relationship. This suggests that the Amihud illiquidity ratio 
(stock liquidity) decreases (increases) up to a certain level of foreign ownership, and then increases 
(decreases) as the shareholdings rise further.  
INVESTOR.
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Panel B of Table 5 presents the estimation results for total local ownership-liquidity relation. By 
construction, the coefficient for total local ownership should yield an opposite sign to total foreign 
ownership given that both variables are perfectly negatively correlated. This is clearly reflected in 
the linear model where total local ownership has a positive coefficient, and similarly, it is 
insignificant or weakly significant at the 10% level. However, the opposing liquidity roles of 
foreign and local investors are not reflected in the quadratic model since the coefficients for total 
local ownership and its squared term do not yield an inverted U-shaped graph. Instead, the result 
depicts a similar pattern as total foreign ownership where the Amihud illiquidity ratio decreases at 
lower levels of shareholding but reverses after reaching the threshold point. The quadratic model 
thus captures the net effect from the dynamic interactions of different types of local investors 
through competing liquidity channels. In terms of the control variables, with the sole exception of 
analyst coverage, all the firm characteristics have their expected signs and are highly significant in 
all model specifications.  
 
4.2 Foreign versus local investors: direct and nominee accounts 
For shares trading in Bursa Malaysia, investors need to open a Central Depository System (CDS) 
account, which acts as the central database representing ownership and movement of securities. 
There are two types of CDS account, namely direct CDS account and indirect (nominee) CDS 
account, and their key differences are summarized in the Appendix. In general, a CDS account can 
only be opened if the person is opening it either as a beneficial owner or as an Authorized 
Nominee.7 Our corporate ownership dataset provides shareholdings for direct and nominee 
accounts, and thus allows us to determine the role of trading account types in the investor type-
liquidity relation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Under Part VIII of the Rules of Bursa Malaysia Depository, a nominee account can only be opened by Authorized 
Nominee, such as banks, brokers and trust companies. These authorized nominees are appointed by Bursa Depository 
for the purpose of holding any deposited securities on behalf of another person. On the other hand, an authorized 
nominee shall furnish to the Bursa Depository the names and other particulars of the beneficial owners of the securities 
deposited in the accounts.  
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Table 5 
Aggregate Corporate Shareholdings and Stock Liquidity 
 
 Linear Model Quadratic Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Total Foreign Ownership 
 -0.1025 -0.2245 -0.2779
* -1.9947*** -1.9674*** -1.9916*** 
(0.1842) (0.1821) (0.1618) (0.5113) (0.4448) (0.4593) 
    3.0745
*** 2.8306*** 2.7888*** 
   (0.8202) (0.6866) (0.6973) 
 -0.1572
* -0.0880 -0.1078 -0.1674* -0.0980 -0.1106 
(0.0907) (0.0769) (0.0687) (0.0896) (0.0753) (0.0677) 
 -1.1381*** -1.2086*** -1.1720*** -1.1181*** -1.1900*** -1.1597*** 
(0.0403) (0.0376) (0.0332) (0.0404) (0.0360) (0.0321) 
 -0.8280 -0.9379*** -0.9274*** -0.8430 -0.9504*** -0.9374*** 
(0.7834) (0.3273) (0.3220) (0.7819) (0.3239) (0.3218) 
 -0.3987*** -0.4632*** -0.4638*** -0.3902*** -0.4549*** -0.4552*** 
(0.0758) (0.0424) (0.0426) (0.0768) (0.0427) (0.0431) 
 0.1107** 0.0730*** 0.0751*** 0.1127** 0.0747*** 0.0759*** 
(0.0439) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0441) (0.0194) (0.0187) 
Constant 0.3364 1.7601*** 2.0679*** 0.3940 1.8160*** 2.2059*** 
(0.6417) (0.3442) (0.3331) (0.6442) (0.3439) (0.3327) 
Adj. R-squared 67.89% 74.51% 74.60% 68.06% 74.65% 74.73% 
       
Panel B: Total Local Ownership 
 0.1025 0.2245 0.2779
* -4.1542*** -3.6938*** -3.5860*** 
(0.1842) (0.1821) (0.1618) (1.1682) (0.9784) (0.9733) 
    3.0744
*** 2.8306*** 2.7888*** 
   (0.8202) (0.6866) (0.6973) 
 -0.1572
* -0.0880 -0.1078 -0.1674* -0.0980 -0.1106 
(0.0907) (0.0769) (0.0687) (0.0896) (0.0753) (0.0677) 
 -1.1381*** -1.2086*** -1.1720*** -1.1181*** -1.1900*** -1.1597*** 
(0.0403) (0.0376) (0.0332) (0.0404) (0.0360) (0.0321) 
 -0.8280 -0.9379*** -0.9274*** -0.8430 -0.9504*** -0.9374*** 
(0.7834) (0.3273) (0.3220) (0.7819) (0.3239) (0.3218) 
 -0.3987*** -0.4632*** -0.4638*** -0.3902*** -0.4549*** -0.4552*** 
(0.0758) (0.0424) (0.0426) (0.0768) (0.0427) (0.0431) 
 0.1107** 0.0730*** 0.0751*** 0.1127** 0.0747*** 0.0759*** 
(0.0439) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0441) (0.0194) (0.0187) 
Constant 0.2339 1.5355*** 1.7900*** 1.4737* 2.6791*** 3.0031*** 
(0.7112) (0.3898) (0.4065) (0.7868) (0.5100) (0.5438) 
Adj. R-squared 67.89% 74.51% 74.60% 68.06% 74.65% 74.73% 
       
Year  NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Industry  NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Notes:  The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in the notes to Table 3. The dependent variable is  
, with all the independent variables take lag one (t –1), as specified in equations (2) and (3) for linear and 
quadratic models, respectively. The key independent variable of total foreign ownership and total local ownership enter 
separately into the regression. Coefficients for year and industry dummies are not reported for brevity. Double-clustered 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The number of observations for all columns is equal to 4192. The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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In this analysis by trading account types, we have four proxies for  namely foreign 
direct account, foreign nominee account, local direct account and local nominee account. Panel A of 
Table 6 presents the estimation results for equations (2) and (3) in the case of foreign ownership-
liquidity relation. The variable for foreign direct account is insignificant in the linear model and 
merely significant at the 10% level when a quadratic model is fitted. Instead, the analysis reveals 
that the significant relationship between total foreign ownership and liquidity in the previous Table 
5 is driven solely by those foreign investors trading through the nominee accounts. Since most of 
the beneficial owners are foreign institutions, the significance of the first-order and squared 
coefficients for foreign nominees indicates that the non-monotonic relationship arises because of 
competing liquidity channels.   
 
In the case of local ownership, Panel B shows that local nominee accounts, with mean 
shareholding at least three times larger than foreign nominee accounts, are not significantly 
associated with liquidity. Instead, the liquidity roles are taken up by local investors who trade 
through the direct accounts. The significance of the first-order and squared coefficients for local 
direct account suggests that a monotonic relationship is unrealistic because the variable consists of 
local institutions, local individual investors and local government agencies. Each investor group 
might influence liquidity through different channels, and the interactions of investor heterogeneity 
and competing liquidity channels could be responsible for the reported non-monotonic relationship 
between aggregate local direct account and stock liquidity. The results underscore the importance of 
functional form when specifying the liquidity model. If researchers focus only on the asymmetric 
information effect, they will draw their conclusion based on the insignificant coefficient for local 
direct account in the linear model, and hence erroneously disregard the liquidity roles played by 
local investors.   
 
 
INVESTOR,
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Our results complement the findings of Lim et al. (2013) who find that foreign investors who 
trade through the nominee accounts are responsible for the swift incorporation of public information 
into the prices of Malaysian stocks. However, such price discovery does not occur when foreign 
investors trade through the direct accounts. These authors attribute the information advantage of 
foreign investors in the local market to their superior skills in processing public news. To further 
determine whether this is purely a “nominee” effect, Lim et al. (2013) re-estimate their models by 
replacing foreign nominees with local nominees. Their results show that local nominees and the 
squared term are statistically insignificant, thus confirming the significant effect of foreign 
nominees is due to the “foreign” nature of ownership and not “nominee” per se. Taken together, the 
price efficiency finding of Lim et al. (2013) and our result on liquidity reaffirm the importance of 
trading account types in general, and nominee accounts in particular.  
 
4.3 Foreign versus local investors: disaggregate shareholdings 
The empirical results thus far demonstrate that when the level of shareholdings is aggregated, its 
relationship with liquidity does not conform to a monotonic function. The significance of the first-
order variable and its squared term in the quadratic model for (Table 5: total foreign 
ownership and total local ownership; Table 6: foreign nominee account and local direct account) 
indicates the existence of optimality in ownership, in which stock liquidity increases at lower levels 
of ownership but decreases as the shareholdings rise beyond the threshold point. Going beyond the 
interpretation, the non-monotonic relationship in the quadratic model reflects the competing 
liquidity roles of various investor groups and the interactions of different liquidity channels. We 
first explore the issue of investor heterogeneity by decomposing investor types into institutions, 
individuals, government agencies and nominees.  
INVESTOR
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Table 6 
Corporate Shareholdings (Direct Versus Nominee Accounts) and Stock Liquidity 
 
 (A) Foreign Ownership  (B) Local Ownership 
 Linear Model Quadratic Model  Linear Model Quadratic Model 
 0.0643 1.3965
*    
(0.1604) (0.7289)    
  -2.3849
*    
 (1.3787)    
 -0.8801*** -3.0409***    
(0.3028) (0.5631)    
  4.3488***    
 (0.9356)    
    0.2585 -1.3920
** 
   (0.1864) (0.6931) 
     1.4772** 
    (0.5911) 
    0.3311
* 0.0617 
   (0.1906) (0.5866) 
     0.4942 
    (0.7124) 
 -0.1047 -0.1035  -0.1070 -0.1052 
(0.0677) (0.0673)  (0.0674) (0.0668) 
 -1.1575*** -1.1337***  -1.1740*** -1.1834*** 
(0.0328) (0.0322)  (0.0329) (0.0335) 
 -0.9307*** -0.9345***  -0.9247*** -0.9551*** 
(0.3195) (0.3218)  (0.3225) (0.3276) 
 -0.4551*** -0.4499***  -0.4654*** -0.4530*** 
(0.0431) (0.0428)  (0.0421) (0.0414) 
 0.0778*** 0.0788***  0.0745*** 0.0743*** 
(0.0189) (0.0190)  (0.0188) (0.0190) 
Constant 2.0762*** 2.0938***  1.7719*** 2.2158*** 
(0.3199) (0.3258)  (0.4015) (0.4811) 
Year YES YES  YES YES 
Industry YES YES  YES YES 
N 4192 4192  4192 4192 
Adj. R-squared 74.68% 74.84%  74.59% 74.68% 
Notes:  The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in the notes to Table 3. The dependent variable is  
, with all the independent variables take lag one (t –1), as specified in equations (2) and (3) for linear and 
quadratic models, respectively. The key independent variable of corporate shareholdings is decomposed into foreign 
direct account, foreign nominee account, local direct account and local nominee account. Coefficients for year and 
industry dummies are not reported for brevity. Double-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
asterisks ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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In the case of foreign ownership, Panel A of Table 7 reaffirms that only foreign investors who 
trade through the nominee accounts are significantly associated with the liquidity of Malaysian 
stocks. While the significant negative coefficient in the linear model suggests liquidity 
improvement with higher foreign nominee shareholdings, the quadratic model implies the existence 
of a threshold level which might be driven by the interactions of competing liquidity channels. In 
contrast, foreign institutions and foreign individual investors who trade through the direct accounts 
are not significantly associated with liquidity, confirming our earlier results in Table 6. This piece 
of evidence highlights not only the importance of within-country foreign investor heterogeneity but 
also the selection of trading account types. In the extant literature, cross-country liquidity studies 
are generally in favor of opening the domestic stock markets to foreign investors (Tesar and 
Werner, 1995; Vagias and van Dijk, 2012). However, Ng et al. (2015) show that the liquidity 
effects depend on the types of foreign investors– controlling foreign direct investors reduce 
liquidity in the domestic equity markets, whereas foreign portfolio investors contribute significantly 
to liquidity improvement. We complement Ng et al. (2015) by showing that the types of account 
that foreign investors trade do matter for liquidity. In country-specific studies on Indonesia, Rhee 
and Wang (2009) and Agudelo (2010) find that stocks with higher foreign institutional ownership 
experience lower liquidity. However, for the local Malaysian market, our results are uniquely 
different because the liquidity effect is only manifested in the nominee accounts of foreign 
investors. Unlike all previous studies, we further document that the relationship between foreign 
investors and stock liquidity is non-monotonic, highlighting the presence of optimality in foreign 
shareholdings.    
 
When disaggregating local ownership, Panel B of Table 7 shows that not all types of local 
investors who trade through the direct accounts are affecting the liquidity of Malaysian stocks. Only 
local individual investors and local institutions are playing their important liquidity roles. The level 
of government shareholdings is not significantly associated with stock liquidity. It is worth 
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highlighting that the capital market effects of government ownership have been extensively 
examined in the context of state-owned enterprises, privatization and political connections. 
However, its relationship with stock liquidity is not well established, with our literature search only 
finds Choi et al. (2010), Borisova and Yadav (2012) and Ding (2014). Using the China stock 
markets as case study, Choi et al. (2010) find that firms with higher government ownership 
experience increases in bid-ask spread before the period of institutional reforms (1995-2000). 
However, in the post-period of institutional reforms (2001-2003), the link between government 
shareholdings and stock liquidity becomes insignificant which they attribute to the reduction of 
information asymmetry. In stark contrast, Ding (2014) finds that government participation as top 
ten shareholders increases the liquidity of Chinese listed firms, driven mainly by higher trading 
activity from investors who see the value-enhancing benefits of political connections. Borisova and 
Yadav (2012) report a lower overall level of information asymmetry for partially privatized firms 
because they are subject to greater public scrutiny. Coming back to Table 7, the insignificant result 
might be because our variable for government shareholdings is merely capturing government 
participation. A stronger and active government involvement in these Malaysian firms, measured by 
the concentration of government ownership (such as the largest shareholdings, blockholdings or 
ultimate ownership), might exacerbate information asymmetry as the government is privy to a much 
wider base of firm, political and macro-level private information. We leave this possibility for 
future research. 
 
Moving to local individual investors, previous studies generally report a positive relationship 
with stock liquidity. Amihud et al. (1999) contend that liquidity should be an increasing function of 
noise trading, consistent with the theoretical prediction in models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). To test their hypothesis, the authors capitalize on the unique 
setting in Tokyo Stock Exchange where companies are permitted to reduce their stocks’ minimum 
trading unit (MTU) so that a larger number of small investors can afford to invest. Amihud et al. 
(1999) find that a reduction in MTU over 1991-1996 increases the number of individual 
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shareholders, and their noise trading leads to liquidity improvement. This finding is further 
confirmed by Ahn et al. (2014) for latter sample period of 1996-2005. They find that the substantial 
increase in individual investors due to Japan’s MTU reduction is associated with greater noise 
trading and higher level of liquidity. Using retail trading dataset, Wang and Zhang (2015) report 
higher liquidity for U.S. stocks that are more heavily traded by individual investors, and the positive 
liquidity effect is stronger for firms with greater information asymmetry. In Table 7, the negative 
coefficient for local individual shareholdings in the linear model is consistent with previous 
findings that the participation of individual investors is associated with liquidity improvement. 
However, the quadratic model suggests that the relationship is not merely driven by noise trading, 
given that the increases in liquidity will reverse once the individual shareholdings reach the 
threshold level.  
 
Last but not least, the linear model in Table 7 shows that the variable for local institutions has a 
highly significant positive coefficient, indicating that higher local institutional ownership is 
associated with greater illiquidity ratio where prices move a lot but the volumes traded are low. The 
results contradict existing findings reported by Rubin (2007) and Jiang et al. (2011). Both studies 
find that local institutions improve liquidity through higher trading activity and effective monitoring 
of corporate managers from exploiting private information, respectively. On the other hand, 
Agarwal (2007) predicts a non-monotonic relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity 
due to the trade-off between the two competing effects of information asymmetry and competition. 
His analysis using U.S. firm-level data establishes the existence of a threshold level for institutional 
ownership. Again, our results are inconsistent with the literature, as the level and squared 
coefficients for local institutional ownership are statistically insignificant in the quadratic model. 
This indicates the dominance of the negative liquidity effect, which we conjecture is attributable to 
the large shareholdings held by government-owned institutions– examples include the Employees 
Provident Fund, the Armed Forces Fund Board, the National Equity Corporation, the Pilgrimage 
Fund Board and the Social Security Organization. These five public institutions account for about 
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70% of total local institutional shareholdings in Bursa Malaysia (see references cited in Lim et al., 
2013). Their blockholdings might impair liquidity through two possible channels– the privileged 
access to private information (Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Rubin, 2007) and/or infrequent trading 
activity through buy-and-hold strategies (Brockman et al., 2009). These two channels apply even in 
the context of foreign blockholders as Ng et al. (2015) find they are the driving forces for the 
negative relationship between controlling foreign direct investors and stock liquidity. 
 
4.4 Corporate shareholdings and stock liquidity: a synthesis 
Our analysis from aggregate to disaggregate shareholdings identifies three investor groups that 
are significantly associated with the liquidity of Malaysian stocks, namely foreign nominees, local 
institutions and local individual investors. Given that the estimations are performed separately for 
foreign and local investors, we now put them in the same model to determine whether their 
explanatory power still remains intact when competing against each other. The first panel of Table 8 
presents the pooled OLS estimation results for our final liquidity model. The coefficients for foreign 
nominees and local individuals are highly significant, with their relationship with Amihud 
illiquidity ratio follows a U-shape. With the addition of foreign nominee variable in the final model, 
the explanatory power of local institutions is somewhat subsumed, only significant at the 10% level. 
The results for firm characteristics have been very consistent throughout this paper in terms of 
having the expected signs and highly significant coefficients. Analyst coverage turns significant 
with a negative coefficient, suggesting that firms with more analyst coverage are associated with 
higher liquidity, lending support to the finding of Roulstone (2003) that security analysts play the 
role of information intermediaries whose services level the playing field for uninformed investors. 
Though only double-clustered standard error is reported to account for both time and firm effects 
since the precise form of the within-cluster correlation is unknown, our results nevertheless are 
robust to different treatments of the standard errors as suggested by Peterson (2009)– White 
heteroscedastic-robust, firm-clustered and time-clustered. 
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Table 7 
Disaggregate Corporate Shareholdings and Stock Liquidity 
 
 (A) Foreign Ownership  (B) Local Ownership 
 Linear Model Quadratic Model  Linear Model Quadratic Model 
 -0.2978 -1.4395    
(0.4270) (1.6924)    
  2.4814    
 (2.9682)    
 0.0556 1.1758    
(0.1702) (0.9696)    
  -2.0629    
 (1.8185)    
 -0.8770*** -2.8618***    
(0.3002) (0.5461)    
  4.1019***    
 (0.9308)    
    -0.4599
* -3.6837*** 
   (0.2753) (0.7762) 
     3.8226*** 
    (0.9725) 
    0.5426
*** 0.5517 
   (0.1817) (0.3976) 
     0.1264 
    (0.6008) 
    0.4024 -0.1069 
   (0.2952) (0.5774) 
     0.8027 
    (0.7502) 
    0.3228
* 0.1458 
   (0.1926) (0.7422) 
     0.3555 
    (0.9158) 
Year YES YES  YES YES 
Industry YES YES  YES YES 
N 4192 4192  4192 4192 
Adj. R-squared 74.67% 74.82%  74.88% 75.27% 
Notes:  The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in the notes to Table 3. The dependent variable is  
, with all the independent variables take lag one (t –1), as specified in equations (2) and (3) for linear and 
quadratic models, respectively. The key independent variable of corporate shareholdings is decomposed into individual 
investors, institutions, government agencies and nominees. For brevity, estimates for control variables, constant, year 
and industry dummies are suppressed but available upon request. Double-clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  The asterisks ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Robustness Checks on Final Liquidity Model 
 
 Pooled OLS Fama-MacBeth Two-Step  
System GMM 
   0.2070** 
  (0.1008) 
 -2.7676
*** -2.6383*** -10.2307*** 
(0.4919) (0.3617) (2.1791) 
 3.8190*** 3.7415*** 21.6208*** 
(0.8596) (0.6755) (4.7504) 
 -3.9815*** -4.0586*** -3.1536*** 
(0.7129) (0.5397) (0.6960) 
 3.7381*** 3.8053*** 4.4122*** 
(0.9203) (0.7467) (0.9121) 
 0.2692* 0.2747* 1.5072*** 
(0.1618) (0.1151) (0.3367) 
 -0.1245** -0.1290* 0.2615*** 
(0.0614) (0.0543) (0.0913) 
 -1.2716*** -1.2668*** -0.7820*** 
(0.0396) (0.0346) (0.0960) 
 -1.0669*** -1.2111** -0.7003 
(0.3260) (0.3393) (0.7799) 
 -0.3969*** -0.3780*** -0.5437*** 
(0.0456) (0.0442) (0.1132) 
 0.0717*** 0.0842** 0.1108** 
(0.0185) (0.0311) (0.0446) 
Constant 3.8128*** 2.3605*** -2.1039** 
(0.4883) (0.5817) (1.0132) 
Year YES NO YES 
Industry YES YES YES 
N 4192 4192 3591 
R-squared 75.62% 75.79%  
Notes:  The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in the notes to Table 3. The dependent variable is  
, with all the independent variables take lag one (t –1). The analyses from aggregate to disaggregate 
shareholdings identify foreign nominess, local institutions and local individual investors as playing significant liquidity 
roles, and thus these variables are included in the final liquidity model.  Coefficients for year and industry dummies are 
not reported for brevity.  
In the pooled OLS, double-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. For the Fama-MacBeth two-step 
regression,  the standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted using the Newey-West procedure.   
In the two-step system GMM, the final liquidity model is rewritten as a dynamic panel by including lagged value of 
Amihud illiquidity ratio as a regressor.  The model passes the standard diagnostic tests for dynamic panel, namely: (1) 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests with the the null of no first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively, in the first-
differenced residuals; (2) the Hansen test of over-identification with the null that all instruments are valid. These results 
are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.  
N denotes the number of observations. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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As a robustness check, we estimate the final liquidity model with Fama-MacBeth two-step 
regression which aims to pick up cross-sectional effect, possibly the main source of variation in our 
data given the short time series of 8 years. This procedure involves estimating cross-sectional 
regression for each year separately, and then inferences are drawn from the time-series averages of 
the estimated coefficients. Peterson (2009) shows that the Fama-MacBeth regression produces 
unbiased standard errors and correctly sized confidence intervals when the data exhibit only cross-
section dependence in which the residuals are correlated across different firms in a given year. In 
the analysis, year dummies are excluded due to its cross-sectional nature, and the standard errors are 
adjusted for potential autocorrelations using the Newey-West procedure. The second set of results 
in Table 8 shows that the Fama-MacBeth regression does not affect the signs and statistical 
significance of all independent variables, implying that the inferences drawn from our main pooled 
OLS estimator are robust.  
 
To address the concern of endogeneity, in particularly unobserved time-invariant firm 
characteristics and reverse causality, we use the two-step system generalized method-of-moments 
(GMM) estimator. The dynamic panel GMM is now an accepted mechanical approach to handle 
endogeneity in corporate finance research, mainly because of the difficulty in finding a strictly 
exogenous external instrument (see Wintoki et al., 2012). The system GMM estimator is designed 
to account for both the unobserved firm-fixed effects and the potential joint endogeneity of all 
regressors. The results from the two-step system GMM are presented in the last column of Table 8. 
All the variables retain their signs and statistical significance with three exceptions. First, the 
coefficient for local institutions, which is weakly significant at the 10% level in pooled OLS and 
Fama-MacBeth regressions, becomes highly significant with the positive sign unaffected. Second, 
the coefficient for analyst coverage switches from negative to positive sign, indicating that more 
analysts are associated with lower level of liquidity. However, the sensitivity of this variable to 
different models and estimators cautions against drawing strong inference for security analysts. 
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Third, the once highly significant variable of stock return has been rendered insignificant when the 
model is specified as a dynamic panel. Nevertheless, the significant results for our three investor 
groups in pooled OLS, Fama-MacBeth and system GMM estimators confirm that their liquidity 
effects are robust. With the model passes the standard diagnostic tests for dynamic panels, this 
suggests that the final liquidity model is not plagued by endogeneity concern. Adding further 
credence to our conclusion, the documented non-monotonic relationship is not consistent with a 
story of reverse causality that these investor groups prefer to hold more liquid stocks. However, we 
acknowledge that there is no statistical way to ascertain that the endogeneity problem has been fully 
resolved.  
 
5.  The Channels Underlie Investor Types and Stock Liquidity Relationship 
Our earlier theoretical discussions have singled out three potential channels through which 
investors might affect stock liquidity. The proposed mechanisms include information asymmetry, 
competition among informed traders and the level of trading activity. We start with identifying the 
best available proxies and then present the empirical results.  
 
5.1 Selection of proxies for the liquidity channels 
The most widely cited channel that links investor types to stock liquidity is the asymmetric 
information effect, in which the trading of privately informed investors exacerbates information 
asymmetry. This group of theoretical models predicts that informed (noise) trading reduces 
(improves) stock liquidity. Since information asymmetry is not directly observable, existing 
liquidity studies generally decompose the bid-ask spreads to extract the adverse selection 
component (see Agarwal, 2007; Brockman et al., 2009; Ding 2014).8 Given the absence of high 
frequency bid-ask spreads data for Malaysian stocks, we follow Ng et al. (2015) in using the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The early literature has proposed covariance-based and trade-indicator-based models to decompose bid-ask spreads 
into three components of order processing, inventory holding and adverse selection. Despite their popularity, the 
empirical performance of the adverse selection component in quantifying information asymmetry among traders has 
received relatively less attention. Even among the few studies, the results for these adverse selection models of the 
spread are not encouraging (see Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Van Ness et al., 2001). 
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probability of information-based trading (PIN) to test the information asymmetry channel on four 
grounds. First, the adverse selection component is an outcome measure of information asymmetry, 
whereas the source of the latter comes from the trading of informed traders who possess private 
information. Second, the PIN measure originates from the theoretical model of Easley et al. (1996), 
and this theoretically derived measure is designed to measure the proportion of trades motivated by 
private information. Third, PIN is a widely used empirical proxy for information asymmetry and 
has been subject to extensive scrutiny and continuous refinements. Confirming its empirical 
validity, previous studies show that PIN is highly correlated with both the adverse selection 
component of spread (Chung and Li, 2003; Brennan et al., 2015) and ex-ante firm characteristics 
associated with information asymmetry (Aslan et al., 2011; Lai et al., 2014). Fourth, Lai et al. 
(2014) are able to access intraday stock transaction data for 30,095 firms from 47 countries 
worldwide, and show that their constructed PIN estimate is a reliable proxy for information 
asymmetry. We obtain the annual PIN data for Malaysian stocks from Lai et al. (2014), where a 
higher value of PIN indicates greater level of information asymmetry among market participants.9 
 
Strategic trader models (Subrahmanyam, 1991; Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, 1992) predict that 
liquidity improves when the number of informed investors increases. Browsing through existing 
theoretical models with multiple informed traders, a typical feature is that the number of informed 
traders characterizes the extent of competition among them. Empirically, Agarwal (2007) is the 
only liquidity study that explores this information competition channel using the number of local 
institutions as its proxy, where a higher number indicates greater competition over information. The 
pioneering empirical work on information competition by Armstrong et al. (2011) and Akins et al. 
(2012) confirms the validity of this proxy when they explore the moderating role of competition on 
the pricing of information asymmetry. Thus, guided by the existing theories and the consensus in 
empirical literature, we examine the competition channel using the summation of holders for three 
investor groups– the number of foreign nominees, the number of local institutions and the number 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Lai et al. (2014) construct the annual firm-level PIN estimates for the sample period 1996-2010 using newly available 
global high frequency data provided by Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database.  
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local individuals, all extracted from the ownership dataset provided by Bursa Malaysia.  
 
The trading activity of investors is another possible channel that links corporate shareholdings to 
stock liquidity. Previous liquidity studies generally refer to the work of Stoll (2000) in which total 
liquidity costs are partitioned into information and real friction costs. The former is associated with 
information asymmetry, whereas the latter arises due to differences in trading activity. Within this 
framework, the common proxies used for testing the trading channel are share trading volume, stock 
turnover, number of trades or trade sizes (see Rubin, 2007; Brockman et al., 2009; Ding, 2014; Ng 
et al. 2015). However, the above indicators measure aggregate level of trading activity but do not 
capture the trades of each investor group. An exception is Wang and Zhang (2015) who have access 
to a comprehensive retail trading dataset, which permits them to attribute the higher liquidity of 
U.S. stocks to the intense trading of individual investors. While we acknowledge that the best proxy 
for testing the trading channel should be derived from the actual trades of each investor group, 
unfortunately, Bursa Malaysia does not compile investors’ trading data at the firm level. 
Constrained by data availability, we thus follow the convention in the literature and use stock 
turnover from Datastream as our proxy for the trading channel. 
 
5.2 Estimation results and discussions 
We follow Ng et al. (2015) in estimating two regressions separately. In the first stage, the proxy 
for liquidity channel is regressed against the selected investor group. The second stage involves re-
estimating the original liquidity model but with the addition of the proxy for liquidity channel. The 
sign and statistical significance for the liquidity channel proxies in both regressions are used to 
draw inferences on their mediating roles.  
 
Table 9 presents the estimation results to uncover the underlying channels that link the three 
investor groups to stock liquidity. Even though the table is organized according to liquidity 
channels, our discussions here will move from one investor group to another. We start with foreign 
investors who trade through the nominee accounts, in which their relationship with Amihud 
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illiquidity ratio follows a U-shape. Such non-monotonic relationship reflects the dominance of 
different channels at each side of the threshold point. In the first channel of information asymmetry, 
the variable for foreign nominees is negatively associated with PIN, suggesting that the higher 
foreign shareholdings are associated with lower level of informed trading based on private 
information. In column (2), PIN yields the expected positive coefficient, consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that higher level of informed trading reduces stock liquidity. The two 
regressions indicate that foreign nominees improve liquidity because they lower the level of 
information asymmetry. Following similar line of interpretation, we can infer that both competition 
and trading channels lead to further improvement in liquidity. Putting the whole results into 
perspective, all three channels imply a monotonic positive relationship in which higher 
shareholdings by foreign nominees increase the level of stock liquidity. We conjecture that the 
reported reduction in liquidity after foreign shareholdings exceed the threshold point is due to the 
dominance of a strong negative effect, which is not captured by the widely cited and theoretically 
grounded liquidity channels. This undetected channel could be unique to nominee trading and thus 
warrants an in-depth analysis in future research.  
 
Turning to local institutions, column (1) shows that its variable is positively associated with PIN. 
Ng et al. (2015) find similar positive relationship for their foreign direct investors who hold at least 
5% of the outstanding shares. Their argument is that foreign direct investors have controlling 
stakes, and thus are privy to private information of the domestic firms. In the context of Malaysian 
stock market, more than 70% of local institutional ownership are held by government-owned 
institutions. Their large shareholdings with control rights give them privileged access to private 
information, and thus increase the level of information asymmetry. The empirical literature 
consistently shows that local blockholders exacerbate information asymmetry and cause liquidity to 
decrease (see Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Rubin, 2007). This reduction in liquidity also operates 
through the competition and trading channels, as reported in columns (3) and (5), respectively. In 
other words, the large shareholdings of these government-owned institutions reduce the number of 
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outstanding shares available to other investors, and thus lower the degree of competition among 
traders which has a negative effect on stock liquidity. Furthermore, their infrequent trading activity 
due to the use of buy-and-hold strategies also impairs the liquidity of Malaysian stocks. All three 
channels suggest a reduction in stock liquidity, consistent with the monotonic negative relationship 
between local institutional shareholdings and stock liquidity.   
Our disaggregate analysis reports a U-shaped relationship between local individual investors and 
the Amihud illiquidity ratio, reflecting the interactions of competing liquidity channels. Table 9 
shows two opposing effects are at play. On one hand, local individual investors increase the level of 
information asymmetry (column 1) and reduce the degree of competition among traders (column 3), 
both of which lead to a reduction in liquidity. The positive relationship between individual investors 
and PIN seems puzzling because the former have been regarded as uninformed traders due to 
behavioral biases (Barber and Odean, 2000), noise trading (Foucault et al., 2011) and the lack of 
information advantage about local stocks (Seasholes and Zhu, 2010). However, there is growing 
empirical evidence that individual investors possess valuable private information and engage in 
informed trading (Kelley and Tetlock, 2013; Fong et al., 2014a; Tian et al., 2015). This possibility 
of individuals having private information cannot be ruled out in the context of Malaysia, given the 
prevalence of ownership concentration in the hands of family (see Carney and Child, 2013). If this 
possibility is valid, then the large shareholdings of individuals will reduce the number of 
outstanding shares available to other investors, and thus lower the degree of competition among 
traders. On the contrasting end, the active trading activity of small individual investors improves the 
liquidity of Malaysian stocks (column 5), consistent with theoretical predictions and previous 
empirical findings (Amihud et al., 1999; Ahn et al., 2014; Wang and Zhang, 2015). The U-shaped 
relationship implies the dominance of positive trading effect at lower levels of shareholdings for 
individual investors. However, once their shareholdings exceed the threshold point, the negative 
effects brought by information asymmetry and competition become the dominant force.  
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Table 9 
Information Asymmetry, Competition and Trading Channels 
 
 Information Asymmetry Competition Trading 
 PIN  ln ILLIQ( )  ln HOLDER( ) ln ILLIQ( )  
ln TURNOVER( )
 
ln ILLIQ( )  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PIN   2.6060***     
 (0.6072)     
ln HOLDER( )     -0.3642***      (0.1029)   
      -0.3969*** 
     (0.0456) 
 -0.0695
*** -3.5426*** 1.6896*** -2.8129*** 1.0906* -2.7676*** 
(0.0199) (0.6796) (0.3728) (0.6718) (0.5773) (0.4919) 
  5.4154
***  3.6615***  3.8190*** 
 (1.0628)  (1.0762)  (0.8596) 
 0.0279
*** -6.8804*** -0.5884*** -5.3732*** 0.5704* -3.9815*** 
(0.0098) (0.8074) (0.1593) (0.7011) (0.2913) (0.7129) 
  6.4776
***  5.0855***  3.7381*** 
 (1.0288)  (0.9079)  (0.9203) 
 0.0167
** 0.5964** -0.2942** 0.5246*** -0.8533*** 0.2692* 
(0.0082) (0.2309) (0.1457) (0.1912) (0.2329) (0.1618) 
  -0.2098***  -0.2820***  -0.1245** 
 (0.0630)  (0.0639)  (0.0614) 
  -1.3401***  -1.1700***  -1.2716*** 
 (0.0455)  (0.0483)  (0.0396) 
  -1.9139***  -1.6091***  -1.0669*** 
 (0.4874)  (0.5624)  (0.3260) 
  0.0487**  0.0893***  0.0717*** 
 (0.0225)  (0.0142)  (0.0185) 
Constant 0.3055*** 3.7497*** 8.3602*** 6.3716*** -7.1491*** 3.8128*** 
(0.0067) (0.5546) (0.0897) (0.6299) (0.1863) (0.4883) 
Year  NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Industry  NO YES NO YES NO YES 
N 3388 3424 4200 4192 4195 4192 
Adj. R-squared 1.81% 72.29% 7.54% 72.53% 2.93% 75.47% 
Notes:  The descriptions for all the variables listed above are given in the notes to Table 3. The three competing liquidity 
channels of information asymmetry, competition and trading are proxied by the probability of information-based trading 
the natural logarithm of the total number of foreign nominees plus total number of local institutions plus total 
number of local individuals ln HOLDER( ){ },  and the natural logarithm of stock turnover ln TURNOVER( ){ },
respectively.  
To determine the significance of each channel, we estimate two sets of pooled OLS regressions. In the first regression, 
the proxy for liquidity channel is regressed against the three investor types. In the second regression, the liquidity 
channel is added as a regressor to our final liquidity model where the dependent variable is ln ILLIQ( ). All the 
independent variables in these regressions take lag one (t –1).  
Coefficients for year and industry dummies are not reported for brevity. Double-clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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6.  Conclusion 
Motivated by the lack of Malaysian liquidity studies, we examine the liquidity roles of various 
investor groups using recently acquired ownership dataset from Bursa Malaysia. This study shows 
the value added of individual country analysis, as our findings on foreign investors and local 
individuals differ greatly from those reported by existing literature including the available cross-
country studies. Both variables exhibit a non-monotonic relationship with stock liquidity, which are 
driven by the interactions of competing liquidity channels. Apart from country heterogeneity, our 
research design highlights several issues that are pertinent to future research on liquidity. First, 
since existing liquidity channels predict countervailing effects, it is unrealistic to assume a 
monotonic linear relationship between investor types and stock liquidity, and thus the functional 
form of the liquidity model should be given serious consideration. In fact, it is a standard practice in 
the managerial ownership literature to specify a quadratic model due to the trade-off between 
incentive alignment and managerial entrenchment effects. Second, our analysis from aggregate to 
disaggregate shareholdings highlights the shortcomings of empirical liquidity studies using macro-
level portfolio equity flows (see Tesar and Werner, 1995; Vagias and van Dijk, 2012) as they ignore 
within-country investor heterogeneity. It is important to consider the types of investor as the 
liquidity effects might differ. Third, the types of account that investors trade do matter for liquidity, 
which in the Malaysian context, is between direct and nominee accounts. In Australia, Fong et al. 
(2014a) and Tian et al. (2015) find that the types of retail brokers (discount versus full-service) that 
investors engage are important to the informativeness of trades. Last but not least, apart from the 
popular information asymmetry and trading effects, liquidity is also driven by the largely ignored 
competition channel. 
 
The dearth of empirical studies deprives exchange regulators of useful input on the liquidity roles 
of different investor groups in Bursa Malaysia. Our findings fill this policy gap. First, consistent 
with theoretical prediction, information asymmetry is detrimental to stock liquidity. It is found that 
the participation of foreign investors in domestic firms helps to reduce information asymmetry, and 
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thus policies to further liberalize the Malaysian stock market are commendable. However, the non-
monotonic relationship challenges the popular policy view that “more is better” and caution against 
the move for full liberalization, as a large negative effect will kick in and dominate when the 
foreign shareholdings exceed the threshold level. Such ownership concentration is a plausible 
reason why local institutional investors and local individual investors are associated with higher 
information asymmetry, the former dominated by state-controlled institutions whereas the latter 
concentrated in the hands of family. Since corporate ownership structure is beyond regulatory 
control, the literature prescribes alternative measures to mitigate information asymmetry such as 
insider trading laws, stricter corporate governance, high quality public disclosure and transparent 
financial reporting. Second, in the presence of information asymmetry, our findings suggest that 
increasing the number of investors and trading activity has a positive effect on liquidity. The policy 
responses to these two channels are unambiguous.  
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Appendix 
Differences between Direct Account and Nominee Account 
 
Direct Account Nominee Account 
It is an account held directly under the 
name of the beneficial owner (such as 
individual, corporate body, institutional 
investors). 
The nominee account is opened under the 
name of the Authorized Nominee, with a 
specific description on who the beneficial 
owner.  
The account holder is the owner of the 
securities in the CDS account, and will 
be registered as shareholder.  
 
The Authorized Nominee is the owner of the 
securities in the CDS account. Hence, its 
name will be registered as the shareholder.  
The beneficial owner is the operator of 
the account. 
The Authorized Nominee	   is the operator 
of the account. 
Eligible for IPO application. Ineligible for IPO application. 
All the paperwork on corporate exercise 
is handled by the shareholder. 
The stock broker will monitor and manage 
corporate actions for securities kept in 
custody such as rights issues, dividend 
payout, bonus issues, and proxy voting. 
The beneficial owner will be charged a 
service fee. 
Dividend entitlement will be mailed 
directly to the account holder. 
Dividend entitlement will be received by 
the Authorized Nominee, which will then 
be redirected to the beneficial owner. 
Eligible to attend AGM. Ineligible to attend AGM, unless stock 
broker provides authorization letter.  
Transfer of securities to third party can 
be done directly. 
Transfer of securities to third party is 
complicated. 
Shareholding for account holder is not 
known to third party. 
Shareholding for beneficial owner is 
known to Authorized Nominee. 
Shareholding for the account holder is 
unaffected in the event the stock broker 
is declared bankrupt. 
There is implication on the shareholding 
of the beneficial owner if the nominee 
company is declared bankrupt. 
Sources: Authors compilation based on information collected from Malaysian stockbroking companies. 
	  
 
 
